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Labour Movements and State Formation in 
Turkey: 







Few will deny that the years between 1950 and 1980 were turbulent 
years in Turkish labour politics – indeed in Turkish politics in general. 
State policies towards labour movements oscillated between the 
granting of rights modelled on Western liberal democracies, followed 
by a revoking of the same rights not long after, and outright violent 
repression. Moreover, most of these policy changes were, ironically, 
enacted in the aftermath of military coups. Many have portrayed these 
developments as the symptoms of a weak democratic system unable to 
safeguard universal rights, which such a system promises. Such an 
analysis promotes a perception of the state mainly as a repressive 
apparatus restraining the rights of the working class, whereas civil 
society and its organizations are a progressive force for good. It could 
be argued, however, especially from a labour standpoint, that another 
perspective on labour movements might help illuminate the repressive 
structures of state-labour relations in a more fruitful and nuanced 
manner. With such an aim in mind, this article sets out to clarify the 
class character of the state, and the inherent bias against labour that 
this brings with it, through a Gramscian analysis of Turkish state 
formation with a special focus on labour.  
Gramsci’s theory seeks to make clear the class character of the state 
by delineating the institutional separation of society into the two 
spheres of civil society and state, and, thereby, exposing the underlying 
structures of state power. In his Prison Notebooks he thus states that 
certain ideas are based on 
 





a distinction between political society and civil society, which is made into and 
presented as an organic one, whereas in fact it is merely methodological […] in 
actual reality civil society and the state are one and the same (Gramsci 1971, pp. 
159-60; Q13, §18, p. 1590 of the 1975 Italian Critical Edition).  
 
The adoption by most social scientists of a narrow definition of the 
concept of the state – as opposed to the comprehensive Gramscian 
definition – reproduces the perception of the state as something 
autonomous, or semi-autonomous, and therefore also extends the 
view that civil society actors are external to the inner workings of the 
state. Within the field of studies on labour, this results in the analysis 
taking on a decidedly pluralist view of labour unions as agents external 
to and in opposition to the state.1 Additionally, some neo-Gramscian 
analyses simplify the complex character of the modern state and 
consequently end up reproducing the civil society-state division to 
varying extents2 due to the lack of attention to the inner structures of 
the integral state complex. The approach to the writings of Antonio 
Gramsci by Adam D. Morton represents a more class and historical 
materialist-oriented application of Gramscian theory, and it is the 
contention in this article that such an approach brings forth new 
aspects of Marxist analyses of the Turkish state, as it provides a more 
rigorous and detailed application of such Gramscian concepts as 
hegemony, passive revolution and the integral state. Gramsci applied 
the concept of passive revolution, among other ways, as a “revolution 
                                                            
1 Here, for instance, we are thinking of the application of the corporatist / pluralist group theory of 
Philippe Schmitter by Robert Bianchi in “Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey” 
(Bianchi 1984). This seminal work partially focuses on state-labour relations in Turkey. The 
corporatist-pluralist perspective on state-labour relations attempts to elucidate how the state 
interferes in civil society and attempts to control pluralist actors. From a Gramscian perspective 
such a theory presupposes the perception of civil society as something in opposition to and 
separate from the state. It, thus, reproduces the civil society/state cleavage which obscures the class 
character of the state, and portrays labour movements as something outside the realm of the state.  
2 A poignant example here is Ahmet Öncü´s Dictatorship Plus Hegemony: A Gramscian Analysis of the 
Turkish State (Öncü 2003), where the state / civil society division likewise is reproduced. It should 
be mentioned here that state/civil society also represents the aspects of domination and hegemony 
respectively, so that the integral state constitutes both coercion and consent. It is the whole of 
society, not restricted to a coercive political sphere that is/should be isolated from the economy. 
For further analysis of this article and Bianchi’s book above by this article’s author, contact 
University of Southern Denmark for a copy of the master’s thesis Labour Movements and State 
Formation in Turkey – Passive Revolution and Uneven Development. 





without mass participation” and as a “‘molecular’ social transform-
ation” (Cf. the editorial note in Gramsci 1971, p. 46). For the purpose 
of overall clarification, it should be mentioned that the concept of 
passive revolution will be applied mainly in the latter sense to 
illuminate the attempt at integration of subordinate classes through a 
series of reforms in the twentieth century, as part of the process of 
capitalist-industrialist state formation in the absence of a fully-fledged 
hegemony.3  
As indicated in the title, Turkish state formation, passive revolution 
and the Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD) of capitalism 
are here presented as three inseparable concepts when observing the 
historical development of class relations in Turkey. The concept of 
passive revolution has a dual character; on the one hand it is based on 
the historical specificities of capitalist state formation in Gramsci´s 
own time – the changing and expansive role of the state, with the 
growing role of civil society, modernization, industrialization, and 
fascist corporatism – and on the other hand a more general principle 
deriving from the specific historical observations of the ability of 
capitalism to reorganize and adapt in the face of organic crises 
(Morton 2011, p. 38). The former, Gramsci noted in his day, “takes 
place when, through a “reform” process, the economic structure is 
transformed from an individualistic one to a planned economy 
(economia diretta) and when the emergence of an “intermediate econ-
omy” – i.e., an economy in the space between the purely individualistic 
one and the one that is comprehensively planned – enables the trans-
ition to more advanced political and cultural forms without the kind of 
radical and destructive cataclysms that are utterly devastating. 
“Corporativism” could be – or, as it grows, could become – this form 
of intermediate economy that has a “passive” character.” (Gramsci 
2007, p. 378, Q8§236). As we shall see, this description of an inter-
mediate economy fits well for Republican Turkey, both before and 
after the turn to a multiparty parliamentary system in the 1950s.   
                                                            
3 Besides this main focus on the 20th century, the article will also briefly serve to highlight the role 
of the Young Turk Revolution as a passive revolution in pre-industrial capitalist Ottoman Turkey, 
which is an example of the first type of passive revolution, as a more Caesarist type of passive 
revolution involving regime change. It is beyond the scope of the article to focus on passive 
revolution expressed as the attempt by subordinate classes to alter things in their favour. 





Passive revolution, in other words, involves both the production 
and the reproduction of capitalism through a rugged, and at times 
violent, process of revolution and restoration. In Turkey this process 
has taken the form of a stunted and delayed development of a 
bourgeois class, and the attendant attempt by state élites to nurture 
capitalist development in the face of foreign competition. Political 
developments in the multiparty era suffered from such developments, 
as a weak and divided bourgeoisie was unable to establish a hegemonic 
structure based on market conditions and the predominance of 
consent. Despite this lack of leadership, the ideological elements that 
were consolidated during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and 
the succeeding single-party rule proved very salient among the working 
classes, and helped partially integrate labour movements into the 
integral State system of the new Turkish State. This modern state, 
which is formed from this process of passive revolution, is unique as 
compared to the pre-capitalist state in that it takes on a specific shape, 
ultimately resulting from the non-political character of surplus 
extraction owing to the market mechanisms on which the state is 
based. The modern state is, thus, based upon the premise of the 
separation of the economic and political aspect of society, which in 
turn leads to the reification (Morton 2011, p. 7) of the state as some-
thing autonomous and separate from civil society. This reification 
leads to Weberian theoretical assumptions about the State, confining 
its role to that of a coercive apparatus. On the other hand, Gramsci’s 
perception of the state as “integral”, as a social and relational structure, 
is an attempt to lay bare its fundamental class character, which is 
obscured by the above-mentioned separation that endows the State 
with a perception of universality and impartiality (Morton 2011, p. 20). 
The relational state is according to Morton “a strategic field in which 
the relations of production are bound up with political and ideological 
relations that consecrate and legitimize them” (Morton 2011, p. 7). 
Thus, the Gramscian state, as opposed to the Weberian one, is defined 
by both consent (civil society) and coercion (state), because of the 
mutual contractual exchange inherent to the capitalist mode of pro-
duction (Morton 2011, p. 72). As the internal logic of the integral state 
is bound up on market mechanisms, Morton applies the concepts of a 





state in capitalist society and the capitalist type of state, which were originally 
developed by Bob Jessop, to denote the extent to which the state 
complex is dominated by market mechanisms. The former describes 
the not yet fully developed capitalist state, where pre-capitalist 
accumulation is the prevalent mode of production, and therefore 
surplus extraction is politicized. In this state, the coercive aspect of 
state actors is dominant, which means that the exercise of power “is 
more transparently articulated” and therefore the class character of the 
state is more obvious. This state retains a functional adequacy signified 
in the ability of the state to reproduce the “requirements of the capital 
relation” (ibid), that is, if you will, the more practical and economic 
aspect of capital accumulation, whereas, in a capitalist type of state, society 
is dominated by the logic of accumulation, in such a manner that dis-
guises the exploitative role of the owners of the means of production. 
This state retains formal adequacy that represents the institutional 
separation of the state and civil society, which is typical for liberal 
democracy. Bob Jessop notes that “This separation is both real and 
illusory” (in Wetherly, Barrow, and Burnham (eds) 2008, p. 146), as the 
modern capitalist state does in fact separate into these two spheres, but 
it is an illusory separation because it only functions to conceal the fact 
that the real power is vested in the owners of the means of production. 
As mentioned earlier by Gramsci, the distinction is “merely method-
ological” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 159-60; Q13, §18, p. 1, p. 1590).  
Although the “goal” is to create conditions that nurture the basis for 
the deepening of capital accumulation, while disguising or mystifying 
the capitalist nature of the state, this is not always the outcome. It is 
worth quoting Jessop at length here:  
 
Nonetheless formal adequacy does not guarantee the material adequacy of the 
capitalist type of state in the sense that the mere presence of this state form 
ensures that it secures the economic and extra-economic reproduction demands of 
the capitalist mode of production. On the contrary, extending the argument that 
form problematizes function (Offe 1984; Jessop 1982), we can say that formal 
adequacy problematizes functional adequacy. Because forms are the strategically selective 
medium through which the contradictions and dilemmas of the capital relation 
develop, there is a permanent tension between form and content. This tension 
calls for action to ensure that form and content complement each other and are 





thereby functional for capital accumulation and political class domination” (Jessop, 
2008, in Wetherly, Barrow, and Burnham (eds) 2008, pp. 137-38). 
  
It should therefore be borne in mind that the establishment of the 
functional adequacy of capitalist production does not automatically 
lead to formal adequacy or a capitalist type of state, and inversely the 
formal adequacy can lead to a crisis in the functional adequacy of the 
integral state. 
The concept of passive revolution is an oft-cited concept within the 
social sciences. It is the assumption here that the concept cannot be 
divorced from the historical roots of capitalist state formation and 
social relations. Passive revolution as state formation is the attempt by 
domestic élites to establish a capitalist hegemony through the imple-
mentation of reforms imported from abroad, while co-opting sub-
altern classes. The spark that ignites this process is the uneven 
relations of global capitalism. The historical aspect of passive revol-
ution is, thus, in Gramsci´s theory, intrinsically linked to the dialectics 
of the historically U&CD of global capitalism. Scholars such as Adam 
D. Morton, Jamie C. Allinson and Alexander Anievas have thus 
pointed to the continuity and compatibility between Gramsci’s theory 
and Lev Trotsky’s concept of U&CD, and as argued by Allinson and 
Anievas, “Trotsky’s theory helps make explicit assumptions present in 
the Prison Notebooks, but never fully thematised” (Allinson and Anievas 
2010, p. 474). To be clear then, Gramsci never explicitly refers to 
U&CD, but the centrality of uneven and combined spatial and 
temporal historical processes of capitalist development in Gramsci´s 
writings has been clearly observed and illuminated. An element central 
to the theory is the mimetic exercise that peripheral élites embark on in 
the quest to catch up as a result of the combined character of global 
capitalist development, which amalgamizes local and international 
forms of development. It is, according to Allinson and Anievas, 
exactly this combined element, which is the defining character of 
capitalist development. The capitalist state is the result of the “expan-
sionary nature of capitalism’s ‘rules of production’” (Allinson and 
Anievas 2009, pp. 56-7), which forces capitals and nations into intense 
competition with each other. 





What the U&CD attempts to describe then, is the unfathomable 
forces that were unleashed by the capitalist modes of production, and 
how this development forced this new system into a direct antagonistic 
relationship with other older modes of production. U&CD describes 
capitalism’s “tendency to exacerbate the inherited unevenness of social 
development whilst simultaneously unifying its parts into a single 
ontological whole” (ibid., p. 55). In other words, there is an inherent 
conflict between the tendency of capitalism to differentiate while 
unifying societies of the international system. This means that uneven 
societies are placed in increasingly direct opposition with each other – 
a situation that results in the simultaneous existence of social groups at 
different developmental stages within the same system. This dialectical 
amalgamation of international development means that the less dev-
eloped borrow from the developed and are able to skip intermediate 
developmental stages – what Trotsky termed the “privilege of 
historic[al] backwardness” (Trotsky 2008, p. 4). 
This intertwining of developed and backwards elements is, thus, an 
expression of the attempt of local élites to adapt imported ideology to 
local circumstances through the granting of concessions to strategic 
social groups, which is in return part of the process of passive 
revolution, where dominant social groups attempt to forge a web of 
alliances in order to establish hegemonic rule. In order not to lose 
sight of the class character of the state, the real starting point of the 
analysis is, thus, the local élites. As noted by Gramsci: “the line of 
development is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is 
‘national’” (Gramsci 1971, p. 240; Q14, §68, p. 1729). A dialectical and 
scalar tendency therefore presents itself, where international inequality 
is increasingly transferred to the domestic sphere, as capitalist develop-
ment takes hold, whereas this development is being initiated from the 
domestic sphere by local élites, again as a response to external press-
ure. The temporal and spatial combined unevenness domestically, 
within the concept of passive revolution, is evident in the way Gramsci 
perceived it as a so-called blocked dialectic of new and old classes, 
vying for state power in the quest for hegemonic predominance 
(Morton 2011, p. 19), in other words a tendency exacerbated by the 
general amalgamation of old and new technology, policy and modes of 





production. In the words of Gramsci, it is a situation where “the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born” (Gramsci 1971, p. 276; Q13, §34, 
p. 311). This temporal unevenness within the process of capitalist state 
formation is the result of accelerated capitalist development, spurred 
on by the contingencies of international market mechanisms.  
The amalgamation of the combined element of U&CD is itself 
evident in the way in which the concepts of consent and coercion, 
hegemony and passive revolution, and a state in capitalist society and the 
capitalist type of state are applied. As noted by Morton, these concepts are 
not to be understood as absolute categories, but rather as “two points 
on a continuum” (Morton 2011, p. 21), so that the state complex is 
never “neither nor”, but always somewhere in between. In other 
words, it is a constant dialectical oscillation between the old and the 
new, existing simultaneously within the same system.  
With this in mind we now turn to a description of the historical 
process of state formation in the pre-multiparty era.  
 
 
2. U&CD and passive revolution in the pre-multiparty era 
2.1 The sick man of Europe 
 
The following section will sketch out a history of the uneven and 
combined character of capitalist state formation – one of the earlier 
mentioned aspects of passive revolution – in the late Ottoman Empire 
and the Republic of Turkey. We illustrate how the capitalist develop-
ment of the modern Turkish state is rooted in the reforms of a 
Western-oriented nationalist state bureaucracy, acting as the entre-
preneurs of capitalism in the absence of a strong and independent 
bourgeoisie.  
As regards the U&CD of the nascent modern Turkish state, two 
important developments should be emphasized. First, the tributary 
character of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a centre-periphery 
dichotomy non-existent in Europe. This dichotomy resulted in delayed 
commercialization, as the bureaucracy retarded the development of 
local centres of power. Therefore, at the time of early capitalist 
reforms, Turkey was markedly agrarian, and generally unaccustomed to 





private property in the countryside. The top-down, élitist rule of the 
mostly urban bureaucrats of the pre-multiparty era was thus unable to 
ideologically incorporate the agrarian masses. Second, there is the role 
of the state bureaucracy as the instigator of capitalist integration, in the 
absence of a developed bourgeoisie, which in its turn is rooted in the 
blocked development of a feudal landed class, and hence the absence 
of commercial agriculture. The latter of course signifies the amalgam-
ation and skipping of stages that are characteristic of the combined 
aspect of capitalist development. The stunted development of the early 
Ottoman bourgeoisie, stemming from the tributary character of Otto-
man social reproduction, and the subsequent emergence of the Young 
Turks, was an expression of the weakening of the Sultanate resulting 
from reforms implemented to save the Empire. Last, we shall deal 
with  the establishment of nascent nationalism and anti-imperialism as 
the sine qua non common sense of the modern Turkish state. 
During the eighteenth century, the military prowess of the modern 
European armies inflicted crushing defeats on the Ottoman armies, 
due to technical and economic advantages of capitalist development, 
which made clear the growing unevenness of the global order. The 
Ottoman palace bureaucracy came to realize that they were forced to 
implement political, military, and economic reform, if they wanted to 
avoid the dissolution of the Empire in the face of increasing European 
encroachments (Keyder 1987, pp. 27-28). “Under the whip of external 
necessity”, to use Trotsky’s phrase (Trotsky 2008, p. 5), the uneven 
global order was being felt as they were under increasing pressure to 
modernize in order to compete internationally. As we shall see, 
though, this wish to mimic European development also entailed an 
integration of the Empire into a European capitalist state system, and 
thus the simultaneous disintegration and finally dismemberment of the 
Empire that the reforms sought to protect. 
Like Russia, the Ottoman Empire was in economic respects a back-
ward country, and mostly an agrarian society at the eve of capitalist 
reforms. This was a consequence of the tributary system, inherited 
from the Byzantine era, where the central state bureaucracy would 
collect a single annual tax from a mainly independent, non-proletarian-
ized, subsistence-based agricultural sector, cultivating state owned 





land. Because of this fiscal arrangement, the bureaucracy was opposed 
to industrialization of the peasantry, as this would set in motion centri-
fugal processes through the privatization of agricultural land, and thus 
the loss of tax revenues and political control (Keyder 1987, pp. 11-12). 
Because of the decreased horizontal conflict between ruling elites, 
which was the opposite case in the feudal system, there was less impet-
us for technological development and productivity gains. Local centres 
of power were less inclined, and had less opportunity, to put the 
squeeze on peasants or invest in new technology. This resulted in 
better conditions for the peasants, who had no strong desire to rebel 
against a system that for the most protected their basic interests 
(Bromley 1994, p. 49; Nisancioglu 2013, pp. 335-6). As opposed to the 
feudal structure in Europe, where the horizontal conflict between 
different fiefdoms were predominant, in the Ottoman Empire it took 
on a more vertical character between the central palace bureaucracy 
and rural peripheral forces. Most of the Ottoman era can thus, to a 
certain extent, be seen as a struggle between the rural periphery and 
the central palace bureaucracy. The latter attempted to contain the 
development of peripheral centres of power, preventing local land-
lords from accruing revenues independently of the center (Keyder 
1987, pp. 8-9). The emergence of the Ayans, local landlords who were 
gaining increasing power, but whose insurrection was quelled by the 
central state with the help of the British, is a poignant example 
(Keyder 1987, pp. 14-19).  
According to Simon Bromley, the Ottoman Empire was highly 
dependent on the conquest of new land in order to keep up tax rev-
enues, because of the above mentioned lack of incentives for endogen-
ous growth, for instance through productivity gains (Bromley 1994: 
48). When the Ottoman “Plunder machine” (ibid.) began to slow 
down, as Britain and France began to dominate the battlefields with 
their modern armies, the Ottoman economy soon found itself in grave 
need of finances. This resulted in increased taxes and the taking up of 
loans from foreign powers, while at the same time restrictions on 
exports of raw materials were loosened. The latter encouraged 
economic activity outside the purview of the central state apparatus, 





and thus undermined the power of the central bureaucracy (Bromley 
1994, pp. 49-51).   
The increasing trade between the Ottoman Empire and the three 
empires of Britain, France and Russia simultaneously increased the 
uneven economic condition between the two sides, and drew them 
closer together in an intertwined and, although uneven, also inter-
dependent relationship. As pointed out by Bromley, one of the main 
preconditions for the development of capitalism in the West was the 
presence of a vast market in the east from which to buy and sell goods 
“without hindrance” (Bromley 1994, p. 56).  
The agents of this increasing European trade, who were overwhelm-
ingly Christian and Greek or Armenian, were more interested in 
religious rights than appropriating state power, which meant that 
private property reforms and a general push for political represent-
ation was never really on the agenda of the majority of the bourgeoisie 
(Keyder 1987, p. 77). As a consequence, a strong bourgeoisie never 
emerged in the nineteenth century. Additionally, the state bureau-
cracy’s deliberate suppression of local landlords meant a landed élite 
never really developed in the Turkish part of the Empire, and, thus, 
halted feudalization, which could have led to mechanisation and 
industrialisation (Keyder 1987, pp. 10-11; Bromley 1994, p. 51). For 
these reasons, the bureaucracy was able to retain power throughout the 
nineteenth and most of the first half of the twentieth century – the 
bureaucracy’s dominance started to wain from 1950s onwards, with 
the introduction of democratic governance and emergence of 
bourgeois politicians who, to a great extent, were organic intellectuals 
of the bourgeoisie.4 This laid the ground for a “statization” of the 
economic developmental trajectory indicative to the process of passive 
revolution as state formation (Morton 2013, p. 149). It is a situation 
where the bourgeois capitalists were not “playing their assigned roles” 
(Allinson and Anievas 2010, p. 471), and thus a situation where the 
state felt compelled to take upon itself the role as the progressive force 
                                                            
4 Organic intellectuals in the sense defined by Gramsci as the strata of intellectuals created with the 
emergence of a new class (Gramsci 1971, p. 5; Q12, §1, p. 1513). Süleyman Demirel for instance, 
one of the great figures of Turkish politics and the leader of the Justice Party, is a poignant 
example, as he was an engineer by education and worked for an American transnational company 
before entering politics (Heper and Sayari 2002, pp. 88-9).  





for capitalist development. As Gramsci noted, a passive revolution 
may be characterized by a situation where “a state replaces the local 
social groups in leading a struggle of renewal” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 105-
106; Q15, §19, p. 1823). All this took place within an international 
atmosphere, in the period leading up to WWI, of protectionism and 
nationalist ideologies. The financial crisis of 1873 had furthered these 
tendencies (Keyder 1987, p. 3), and the social and economic changes 
brought on by the Tanzimat reforms5 caused considerable social 
upheaval and delegitimized the rule of Abdülhamid II. E. Attila 
Aytekin has thus analysed how increased and individualised taxes 
spurred substantial tax revolts throughout the reform period. As 
urbanization took hold, the revolts changed from being rural peasant 
in character to being urban partially bourgeois in the early twentieth 
century (Aytekin 2013, pp. 328-9). Coupled with centrifugal forces of 
the increasing export of raw materials and the authoritarian methods 
of the authorities, the weakened legitimacy of the central palace 
authorities paved the way for new actors to make their move. This was 
the moment of the Young Turks. In the late nineteenth century they 
had sprung out of the westernized segments of the bureaucracy that 
had emerged as parts of the modernizing reforms with the establish-
ment of universities and military after western models (Keyder 1987, p. 
28). They were firm believers in reform, nationalism and republic-
anism, and therefore, demanded the institutionalization of a constitu-
tional monarchy, thereby abolishing the Ottoman Caliphate. With the 
Young Turks enjoying considerable support within the junior officers 
of the military in the early twentieth century, Sultan Abdülhamid II 
was forced to surrender to their demands in 1908 (Öncü 2003, pp. 
311-12). This seminal event, known as the Young Turk revolution, 
marked a decisive turn in Turkish history, as Ahmed Öncü notes, for 
now the Empire had effectively abandoned the sultanate, which was 
based on religious authority, in exchange for the establishment of the 
political rule of a secular bureaucracy (Öncü 2003, p. 312). In a sense it 
also demonstrates the transforming power of capitalism, since feudal 
                                                            
5 The Tanzimat was a series of reforms implemented between 1839 and 1876 as an attempt, 
initiated and implemented by “Europeanized Ottoman bureaucrats” (Cleveland 2012: 82), to 
modernize the Ottoman Empire politically and economically following the European model,. 





Europe and the tributary Ottoman Empire had existed side by side for 
hundreds of years without changing the fundamental system of either. 
But with the power unleashed by the capitalist mode of production, all 
this changed, as it forced the Ottomans to reform themselves in the 
face of highly unequal power relations.  
The Young Turks embarked on a campaign of protectionist econ-
omic policies aimed at developing a national economy and bourgeoisie 
independent of European powers (Ahmad 2008, p. 29). Central in this 
regard was the abrogation of the capitulations6 during WWI (ibid., p. 
29). As noted by Feroz Ahmad, during its only ten years in power the 
Young Turks managed to develop a weak, albeit independent national 
bourgeoisie. The Young Turk state, thus, played the role as the 
entrepreneur of a bourgeoisie, which was a process to continue under 
the Kemalists in the interwar years (Ahmad 2008, pp. 58-61).  
The Young Turks, in a way, seized and directed the scattered and 
disorganized demonstrations of discontent by parts of the masses into 
a conservative reform project. Thus, Gramsci noted, when studying 
Italian history, how “‘progress’ occurs as the reaction of the dominant 
classes to the sporadic and incoherent rebelliousness of the popular 
masses – a reaction consisting of ‘restorations’ that agree to some part 
of the popular demands and are therefore ‘progressive restorations’, or 
‘revolutions- restorations’, or even ‘passive revolutions’” (Gramsci 
2007, p. 252; Q8 §25, p. 957). The constitutionalist and parliament-
arian aspect of the Young Turk revolution was, thus, a progressive 
attempt to soothe political and economic discontent from below, while 
at the same time restoring, or preserving, the power of the dominant 
groups through capitalist reforms. The nineteenth century political 
history of the Ottoman Empire can, therefore, be perceived in large 
part as a struggle between modernizers and conservatives, resulting in 
a long line of reform / restorations7. The westernized bureaucracy – 
first the Young Ottomans and later the Young Turks – can be likened 
to the liberal constitutional reform movements throughout Europe in 
                                                            
6 For Gramsci´s brief comment on the topic of the capitulations, although mainly pertaining to 
Egypt, see Gramsci 1996, Q2§63 (pp. 218-9 of Valentino Gerratana’s 1975 Critical Edition). 
7 The reform movements had, for instance, already in 1876 managed to press through the 
implementation of a constitution and parliament, but it was pulled back again by the sultan just two 
years later in 1878 (Taglia 2015, p. 4).  





the nineteenth century. Indeed, as will be discussed below, these 
bureaucrats were directly inspired by these very European movements 
which Gramsci called “the form of ‘passive revolution’ specific to the 
nineteenth century” (Gramsci 2007, p. 378; Q8, §236, p. 1089).  
As we have seen, the Young Turks’ movement was mostly a bureau-
cratic and military one that emerged out of the Ottoman palace bur-
eaucracy. Young Turks distinguished themselves, by being mostly 
European educated, many of them hailing from military academies. 
These western-educated individuals came together with one specific 
goal in mind; to save the “fatherland” from extinction in the face of 
the encroachment of foreign powers (Taglia 2015, p. 29). As the 
membership increased rapidly, the party named the Ottoman Commit-
tee of Union and Progress (CUP) was established in 1889. The CUP, 
from the beginning, was marred by a schism between a liberal rights-
minded faction and a more social conservative nationalist faction. 
Ernest E. Ramsaur notes how the international ideological currents of 
this period were against the more culturally liberal outlook of the 
former faction. Nationalism was advancing throughout Europe, and in 
the face of both the slow disintegration of the Empire, through 
separatist movements in the Balkans and Armenia, and the threat of 
imperialist European powers, a Turkish-Islamic and nationalist state 
central ideology seemed like the better fit. The nationalist Turkist 
faction, therefore, won the favour of the members of the CUP, and 
this would become the de facto ruling state élite of the Ottoman Empire 
until the end of WWI (Ramsaur 1957, p. 129). This process of ideo-
logical import by the Young Turks, well describes the tendency noted 
by Gramsci that the importers of ideology in the absence of “a local 
economic development” (Gramsci 1992, p. 229; Q1, §150, p. 133) are 
not the productive classes, but “the class of intellectuals” (ibid.). In this 
sense, then the Young Turk bureaucracy functioned as “the ‘intel-
lectuals’ of the bourgeoisie” (Gramsci 1992, p. 150; Q1, §44, p. 53), 
just as Gramsci noted that the old feudal classes in Germany and 
England did (ibid.), in the sense that both were classes in themselves, 
but at the same time functioned as organic intellectuals for another 
class. The bureaucracy is the incumbent “old classes” (ibid.) bent on 
preserving the prevailing order through a process of reform / 





restoration. There is, however, an inherent contradiction in the way 
that the Young Turks sought to save the Empire, and by extension 
preserving their own role in it, by intending to create a hitherto non-
existent bourgeois; on the other hand the inevitable outcome of this 
process was the weakening of the central state bureaucracy itself. The 
bureaucracy thus “produces […] its own grave-diggers” (Marx / Engels 
1992, pp. 15-16), to use the words of Engels in a modified sense. 
The Young Turk era, although relatively short lived, would lay the 
foundation for a central feature of the nascent Turkish state, which 
would prove to be quite salient among labour movements, namely an 
especially entrenched nationalist and anti-imperialist ideological 
outlook. Murat Kaya describes this as a “siege mentality”, which 
permeated the Young Turk movement and elicited the feeling that the 
state could be overun by foreign enemies at any moment. It is worth 
quoting Kaya (2014, p. 142) at length here:  
 
since this siege mentality and security perception, together with a strong 
scepticism and anxiety toward the West among the Young Turk generation, were 
intertwined with the emergence of Turkish nationalism, they would evolve into 
one of the main pillars of Turkish collective memory and remain one of the ever-
lasting features of Turkish nationalism and Turkish nationalist discourse.  
 
This mentality was mainly the result of economic encroachments of 
the West and the loss of the Balkan territories. Especially the latter, 
according to Kaya, elicited a sort of psychological trauma, as they felt 
betrayed by the West who tacitly supported the Balkan nationalists, 
while also making the Empire ethnically and religiously more 
homogenous (Kaya, p. 137).  
In a sense, the uneven and combined characteristics of capitalist 
development is evident in the paradoxical process, that the Young 
Turks, and Ottomans before them, in order to become independent of 
the woes of western encroachments were forced to develop along 
western lines, and thus become further entangled in western influence 
and kept in an economically inferior relationship with it. This rep-
resents, in other words, the paradox inherent in U&CD: that the wish 
to equalize and separate, results in the opposite, namely unevenness 
and combination. 





In the liberal atmosphere that ensued in the aftermath of the 
reinstatement of the constitution, under the nationalist rule of the 
Young Turks, several labour unions emerged mainly in the three urban 
centers of Istanbul, Izmir, and Salonica. During the highly unstable 
years of WWI and the years leading up to it, 46 strikes broke out. The 
CUP reaction to these strikes was by and large repression, with 
occasional incidents of mediation by the high ranking CUP members. 
In general, the CUP had functioned as the implementer of pro-
business reforms and they would not allow the goal of national 
development and reform to be hampered by troublesome workers. 
According to Karakışla “both the Ottoman government and the 
Committee of Union and Progress were under the strong influence of 
national and foreign entrepreneurs.” (Quataert and Zurcher 1995, p. 
33). The Young Turks, thus, during their time in power did not have 
the “luxury” to attempt to incorporate labour movements into the 
state structure through concessions. This is indicative of the temporal 
unevenness with which Turkey was developing. Political ideologies 
were imported from abroad, while the landscape of productive 
relations which had encouraged those ideologies abroad were entirely 
different in Turkey. Nationalism, emerging out of the Western 
industrialized countries as a method of popular integration and 
consent-building, were in Turkey applied to a by and large rural and 
non-commercialized society. The Turkish state was not yet dominated 
by market relations and, as a consequence, surplus extraction took on a 
distinct political and coercive character. 
 
 
2.2 Kemalists, emerging industrialization and anti-imperialist common sense 
 
In the interwar period the independence movement would come to 
consolidate the Republic of Turkey under the rule of General Mustafa 
Kemal. During the first decade of Kemalist rule, until the Great 
Depression in 1930, the Turkish economy was mostly an open econ-
omy, exporting basic agricultural goods. The new nation was still at 
this point almost entirely of an agrarian character, and the new regime 
did not embark on any significant restructuring of the economy during 





this period. It was not until the 1930s that industrial policies were 
implemented, as a response to the Great Depression. The mimicking 
aspect of U&CD, which had spurred on nationalist state development 
since late Ottoman times, took the form of the emergence of a 
nationalist corporatist state ideology in the newly formed Kemalist 
state. Thus, according to Çağlar Keyder (1987, p. 89)  
 
[n]ationalism was a modernizing ideology, specifically concocted for pur-poses 
of ‘late-comer’ states in the nineteenth century Europe. World War I and the 
League of Nations had ratified it as the state-building ideology for the many 
political units carved out of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.  
 
The aim of this new nationalist regime was to “catch up with the 
level of contemporary civilisation” (Balkan and Savran 2002, p. 30). It 
was, however, not until the 1930s that such a nationalist corporatist 
state ideology would become formally institutionalized. As noted 
earlier, Gramsci perceived corporatism to be one form of passive 
revolution in the twentieth century, because, in David D. Roberts’s 
phrase, it represented “a kind of halfway house” (Roberts 2011, p. 249) 
between the old liberal and highly individualistic economy and the 
modern organized economy. The corporatist industrialization policies 
also entailed the early attempts at controlling and integrating the 
working class, through the establishment of state-sponsored apolitical 
labour unions and confederations. As described by Feroz Ahmad, one 
of the first of these was the Association of Industrial Workers of 
Izmir, founded in 1932. This kind of state-sponsored unionization 
would become the norm, and anti-class, apolitical tendencies would 
become entrenched within the labour leadership until the 1960s 
(Quataert and Zurcher 1995, p. 92).  
At the end of the decade, the world entered WWII during which 
“agrarian and merchant capital emerged with unprecedented rates of 
accumulation” (Gülalp 1985, p. 336). This was in large part due to 
increasing external demands for products, and Turkish exports grew in 
consequence (ibid., p. 336). The increase in economic activity and 
exports, however, was attained through wide use of forced labour 
under state-of-emergency measures. The most poignant example was 
the activity in the Zonguldak (Mello 2007, p. 212) and Ereğli (Quataert 





and Zurcher 1995, p. 140) mines on the Black Sea coast. In this period, 
enterprises had ample opportunity to increase productivity without 
having to worry about labour rights. This, for instance, resulted in 
deplorable working conditions in the coal mine of Ereğli, while 
productivity per worker and as a whole increased. Thus, coal product-
ion increased from 3,019,458 tons per day in 1940 to 3,559,848 tons 
per day in 1944 (ibid, pp. 140-41). The widespread existence of forced 
labour, especially during WWII, was indicative of an economy, which 
had not yet fully internalized the logic of the market, but was depend-
ent on state repression for the accumulation of profits. As will be clear, 
the following period, with the implementation of multiparty politics in 
1950 would represent the emergence of rapid industrialization and the 
growth of a market economy, resulting in the development of an 
increasingly extensive civil society. Before turning to this, however, we 
need to consider the ideological basis of the multiparty era, which was 
established in the inter-war years. 
Through the brief historical analysis below it will become apparent 
how the Kemalists managed to establish nationalist and anti-imperialist 
developmentalism as a common sense8 of the modern Turkish state 
through a nationalist state ideology and strategic international alliances. 
The mimicking element within Kemalism, which perceived develop-
ment along Western lines as the best and most effective way to escape 
subordination to the very same Western nations, is intertwined with 
anti-imperialist notions. As expressed by Sencer Ayata and Ayşe-
Güneş Ayata (2007, pp. 214-5),  
 
Kemalists look favorably to the West as a source of inspiration and as a model 
for cultural change, while at the same time blaming it as a source of imperialist 
conspiracy threatening Turkey’s independence, sovereignty, and national unity. 
  
Special attention will also be paid to the question of how anti-
imperialist and nationalist developmentalist discourse became promin-
ent in various labour movements throughout the Republican period, 
thereby opening up for the notion that national economic develop-
                                                            
8 Common sense is here understood in the Gramscian sense as, to use the words of the editors of 
(Gramsci, 1971), “the uncritical and largely unconscious way of perceiving and understanding the 
world that has become “common” in any given epoch” (p. 322).  





ment should be prioritized over class struggle (Boyraz 2012,  p. 112). 
We shall illustrate how the dissemination of the Kemalist ideology of 
the dominant classes was more or less successful in reproducing itself, 
and how this was dependent on the ability of the dominant classes to 
include ideological elements acceptable to the subaltern classes: ideo-
logical concessions, if you will. The ability to make such concessions 
successful hinges especially on the ability of an ideology to contain 
contradictions without disintegrating. The capability of the dominant 
classes to create a hegemonic discourse that can accommodate 
contradictory ideological elements, and present them in a universal 
manner, is paramount since the successful integration of subordinate 
groups into an ideological discourse depends on the ability of the 
hegemonic class to incorporate elements from the world view of 
subordinate classes. Thus, according to Carnoy (1984, p. 70), citing 
Giroux (1981, p. 23),  
 
The dominant fraction does not impose its own ideology upon the allied group; 
rather, it “represents a pedagogic and politically transformative process whereby 
the dominant class [fraction] articulates a hegemonic principle that brings together 
common elements drawn from the world views and interests of allied groups”. 
 
As noted by Murat Belge, Turkish socialism and communism “grew 
up in the garden of Turkish nationalism” (Belge 2009, p. 7), and the 
nationalist independence movement quickly gained the support of 
workers’ and socialist movements during the War of Independence in 
1919 and into the early 1920s. The workers’ support for the nationalist 
movements, and later the Kemalist government, was legitimized by the 
Communist International (Comintern), which supported the Kemalist 
cause, as aid in the anti-imperialist struggle at the Congress of the 
Peoples of the East in 1920. This gave the official stamp of approval 
to Kemalism by the leading authority within socialism and commun-
ism at the time, as a means to fight imperialist powers. Later in 1921, 
Turkey and the Soviet Union even signed a treaty “committing both 
countries to ‘the struggle against imperialism’” (Samim 1981, p. 63). 
This alliance endured even when the Kemalists would later on ban and 
persecute communism. Thus, despite the clear anti-communist policies 
of the Kemalists, the Soviets viewed the Kemalists as a central 





instrument in the fight against imperialism (ibid., p. 63). In this alliance, 
thus, nationalism and anti-imperialism served as the common ground 
on which socialist movements and Kemalists converged. A clear sign 
of the commitment of the workers to the nationalist struggle is the 
example of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Socialist Party of Turkey, 
founded as early as 1919, and an important and active protagonist in 
the struggle for independence. According to Feroz Ahmad, the party 
organized May Day protests against foreign intervention in 1921, and 
on this day, anti-imperialist and socialist slogans could be heard in the 
streets of all the major Turkish cities against the French, Greek, and 
British invaders (Quataert and Zurcher 1995, p. 79). Later, in the 
1930s, a more theoretically well founded leftist Kemalist movement 
saw the light of day. The Kadro movement, consisting of a group of 
leftist intellectuals officially supported by Atatürk, were proponents of 
a form of non-capitalist development, where the surplus would be 
directed by the state for national development and popular prosperity 
(Belge 2009, p. 9). Cemil Boyraz (2012, p. 64) notes how  
 
the principles of anti-imperialism and national developmentalism were usually 
deprived of the anti-capitalist character. This means that Kadro’s étatist path to 
development was actually a capitalist type of accumulation project although they 
considered it as a ‘third way’ and ‘peculiar’ type of developmentalism different 
from socialist and capitalist types.  
 
The main struggle was not between classes, but “between oppressed 
and oppressor nations” (ibid.) in the international arena. Likewise, the 
Turkish Communist Party, established in 1920, under the influence of 
Kadro and the Soviet Comintern, supported the Kemalist state, as a 
force against imperialism (Belge 2009, p. 10). The anti-imperialist and 
nationalist character of Turkish labour movements were, thus, present 
from the earliest days. The simultaneous birth of the Turkish nation 
and the labour movements coupled with legitimization for the 
Kemalist rule by foreign powers and the ideological common ground 
between anti-imperialism and socialism, and, thus, labour rights, 
engrained nationalism and anti-imperialism into the DNA of Turkish 
labour movements. In other words, international and domestic factors 





intertwine spurred on by the intense pressure of capitalist forces to 
form a whole new amalgam of imported techniques and ideologies. 
 
3. Passive revolution of the Turkish capitalist type of state – democracy, 
populism and formal adequacy; a new type of integration  
 
In what follows we shall analyse the further formation and consol-
idation of the capitalist state and the concomitant refinement of the 
integrative techniques of passive revolution, and the role of labour 
movements therein. Attention will be given to how the ideology of the 
dominant classes, Kemalism, changed in accordance with the change 
away from an étatist accumulation model and towards a mixed Import 
Substituting Industrialization (ISI) economy, involving a growing 
private sector, civil society and accompanying civil rights. The state 
became more popularly founded and in general the use of consent as a 
tool of power became more prominent as labour unions were increase-
ingly wooed by the political élite. 
As described earlier, the developmental distinction between a state 
in capitalist society and the capitalist type of state is subject to the 
historical circumstances of U&CD, and a clear distinction between 
these two is, therefore, practically not possible. As with coercion and 
consent in a Gramscian framework, it is more a question of which 
theoretical aspect is most dominant. The modern state will never be 
completely modern, as there will always be remnants of old forces 
mixed with new. The following section, therefore, sets out to chart the 
emergence of the capitalist type of state in Turkey and the degree to 
which the modern integral state was dominated by the institutional 
separation of the political and economic. 
With the new constitution of 1961 an ISI-regime was fully insti-
tutionalized in Turkey (Demiralp 2015, p. 6; Keyder 1987, pp. 150-51). 
ISI is “an economic strategy based on the sequenced expansion of 
manufacturing industry, with the objective of replacing imports” 
(Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005, p. 222). Central to this type of 
economic development is, thus, the nurturing of a domestic market, 
which can be partially achieved through the raising of living standards 
and wages through such measures as labour rights – collective 





bargaining and strikes – and increased social benefits (Keyder 1987, 
pp. 149-51). This is the basis of the so-called “social state”, which was 
implemented after the coup in 1960 (Mello 2007, p. 218).  
As the development of formal adequacy depends partially on the 
development of the rule of law, which upholds the image of equality 
before the law, and thus, formally eliminates the monopoly of power 
by any specific social group, we shall here draw attention to the 
development of important legal reforms in the multiparty era. In 
addition to this, the existence of associations outside the immediate 
realm of the state (civil society) is another important part of formal 
adequacy, as it strengthens the institutional separation between civil 
society and the state. The new legal reforms of the 1960s were a result 
of a desire by the army to prevent the strong majority governments, 
which had been characterized by the Democrat Party (DP) era of the 
1950s, and of the desire to bolster the new ISI-oriented economy with 
a strong domestic market to create demand for the industrial 
bourgeoisie. The former was attained through the establishment of a 
bicameral parliamentary system, with low electoral thresholds, and the 
latter through the granting of rights to organize freely in labour unions 
and the rights to strike and to collective bargaining (Bianchi 1984, p. 
115; Keyder 1987, p. 149). The latter pluralist reforms had major 
effects on the development of a civil society that was institutionally 
separated from the state. To trace this development thoroughly, we 
need to go back slightly further than the multiparty era. As parts of the 
regime’s efforts at slowly opening up the political system, in order to 
partially stem a tide of growing domestic discontent with authoritarian 
single-party rule and to appease Turkey’s international partner, the US 
(Mello 2007, p. 213), the Law of Associations was implemented in 
1946. With this piece of legislation in place, it was suddenly legal to 
establish associations based on social class, although it was still illegal 
for labour unions to engage in political activities. It was a “pre-emptive 
strategy” (Kus and Ozel 2010, p. 5) carried out by the government in 
order to control and integrate the labour unions that were already 
emerging into the political system (Kus and Ozel 2010, p. 5; Mello 
2007, p. 214). Turkish associational life before the period beginning in 
1946 was thus mainly characterized by the prevalence of sporting 





clubs, concentrated in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. As noted by 
Richard D. Robinson “In the case of the Anatolian villager, the 
individual generally belongs to no organization other than the family-
village community, the village mosque […] and the Nation” (Robinson 
1951, p. 431). He further explains how in Gaziantep, a city with 70.000 
inhabitants, there were no other organization than the two political 
parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and DP (ibid.). This 
changed, however, with the new law, as the number of associations 
multiplied eight times to reach over 17,000 nationwide in 1960 
(Bianchi 1984, p. 155). According to Bianchi, “the number of associ-
ations per million people grew from 40 in 1946 to over 100 by 1950, to 
620 in 1960, and then to 1,200 by 1970” (Bianchi 1984, p. 155). With 
the constitution of 1961 and the trade union act of 1963, associability 
experienced further hikes, as the latter piece of legislation granted the 
right to freely establish labour unions, and the right to collective 
bargaining and strikes, as well as “allowing the formation of local 
unions at the work place, federations of unions in the same branch of 
industry, regional labor unions, as well as national confederations” 
(Kus and Ozel 2010, p. 7). The nature of the associations established 
were many fold, and under the rule of the DP government religious 
organizations and the Imam Hatip schools9 proliferated greatly (Jacoby 
2004, p. 113). As we shall see many new political parties, political 
labour unions, and employer unions also appeared between 1950 and 
1980 as a result of these legal reforms.  
With the implementation of the above mentioned labour laws, the 
formal adequacy of the state was strengthened, as collective bargaining 
was implemented and coercion excluded from the immediate 
organisation of labour. Orhan Tuna describes how labour / employer 
negotiations prior to 1963 were virtually impossible, because labour 
did not have any leverage in the form of the right to strike, and 
contracts up until this point were mainly individual, further weakening 
bargaining leverage of the worker (Tuna 1964, p. 427). With the 
implementation of the new labour law of 1963, collective bargaining 
and the right to strike were institutionalized, and hailed by leading 
politicians at the time as an integral part of democracy (Jackson 1971, 
                                                            
9 Imam Hatip schools are state secondary schools for the education of public Imams in Turkey.  





p. 71). This new legislation was meant to level the playing field 
between employers and employees, and thereby live up to the new 
constitution as laying the foundation of the “social state” (Mello 2007, 
p. 218). Employees were no longer dependent on the mercy of the 
employer; as Tuna (1964, p. 429) notes  
 
Most of the employment practices that were unquestionably within the 
unilateral decision-making area of the employer in the past, such as the power to 
discipline and punish, safety and health provisions, overtime work, etc., have been 
brought under the joint administration of workers and management. 
 
These reforms of the modern Turkish state transpired within the 
uneven characteristics of capitalist development in Turkey, taking a 
distinct East-West expression, which revealed itself in both spatial and 
temporal terms in the period in question. The combination of pre-
capitalist and capitalist production is illustrated poignantly in Keyder’s 
(1987, p. 119) remark that 
 
One report by an American expert deplored the gap between isolated examples 
of “twentieth century industrial technology” in state enterprises, and agricultural 
techniques which dated from Hittite times.  
 
Even with the influx of US aid under the Marshall plan in the 1950s, 
uneven development persisted as 63% of the investment was 
channeled to the already prosperous Marmara region and 12% to the 
Aegean region, both located in the west of the country. This tendency 
reinforced an East-West divide in Turkey, which has shaped the 
economic development of the modern Turkish state. The eastern 
regions have, since the seventeenth century, been characterized by 
large-estate feudal-like land ownership. In the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the 
U&CD was expressed through the simultaneous and ongoing primitive 
accumulation in the eastern, predominantly Kurdish regions, disloc-
ating peasants from their land, as mechanization took hold of agri-
culture (White 1998, pp. 150-51), and the capitalist profit accumulation 
mainly in the coastal and western regions. Such developments were 
strengthened by geographically integrating and connecting Anatolian 
cities through the construction of extensive road networks in the 





1950s (Keyder 1987, pp. 127-28), which served as the “geographical 
expansion of capitalist society” (Morton 2011, p. 71).  
With the increasing monopolization of agriculture, 18-20% of 
cultivated land was controlled “by large-estate capital” by 1957, and 
according to Bianchi 3% of landowners controlled 30% of cultivated 
land in 1973 (Bianchi 1984, p. 64; Jacoby 2004, p. 107). The growing 
landless peasantry either migrated to urban areas in the hope of 
securing occupation or became agricultural wage labourers. The 
comprehensive urban migration experienced in this period accentuated 
the clash between rural and urban cultures. Peasants arriving in the 
cities, many of whom were Kurds, retained their rural identities and 
organized themselves along ethnical and regional lines, instead of 
developing a sense of class (Jacoby 2004, p. 108-9; Keyder 1987, pp. 
136-7 and 206). Likewise, many of the employers of the industrial 
bourgeoisie in the 1950s and 60s had their recent roots in the agri-
cultural sector or as provincial merchants, and were not used to 
command a workforce. As a consequence they retained “an individual-
istic mentality and [… did ...] not sympathise with workers’ problems.” 
(Tuna 1964, p. 422). Such a mentality was expressed through a very 
confrontational attitude towards organized labour of the earliest 
private sector employer organization, TISK. It resulted in protracted 
lockouts, labour riots and a great deal of instability (Bianchi 1984, p. 
264-67). It was not until 1971 that the geographical unevenness 
between rural and more modern industrial mentality of employers was 
partially overcome, as a more mature group of bourgeois industrialists 
saw the light of day. They found common ground in the establishment 
of the employer organization TÜSIAD, which consists of 90 of the 
biggest industrialists in Turkey. These entrepreneurs had grown to a 
size where they were increasingly focused towards exports to 
international markets, and were highly emphatic on the importance of 
joining the European Economic Community (EEC). They, therefore, 
perceived the aggressive approach applied by TISK as provoking 
unnecessary class antagonism and volatility thereby “jeopardizing 
Turkey’s chances of entering the Common Market with a Western-
style democracy.” (Bianchi 1984, p. 269). Bianchi states that they 
represented a new current of “progressive conservatism” that sought 





to moderate the authoritarian style of TISK (ibid.). In addition they 
proposed to deepen industrialization in Anatolia in order to decrease 
the extreme concentration of industry in Istanbul and to show greater 
concern for social justice and welfare (Bianchi 1984, p. 269). TÜSIAD, 
therefore, represented an attempt by parts of the big industrial 
complex to influence the political authority into a more accommod-
ating approach to labour issues, as the labour-business conflicts were 
creating political havoc, thus jeopardizing capital accumulation. The 
above-described developments represent a refinement of the process 
of passive revolution through the increasing internalization of the logic 
of the market of the integral state and the adaption to a recognition of 
certain concessions – in the form of democratic rights, and increased 
economic distribution – as means to secure more stable conditions for 
accumulation of profits. The two employer organizations of TISK and 
TÜSIAD, however, continued to pursue their individual political paths 
throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s.  
Another temporal aspect of the passive revolution of especially the 
1960s and 70s, which illustrates the uneven divisions within the 
bourgeois class, was the intra-class conflict between the “old” trading 
bourgeoisie and the nascent industrial bourgeoisie within the umbrella 
employer organization Union of Chambers and Commodity Ex-
changes of Turkey, or Türkiye Odalar Birligi (TOB). This ongoing 
conflict revolved around the accruing of import licenses, and thus, 
scarce foreign exchange reserves. The support of the export-oriented 
DP governments of the 50s tilted in the favour of the traders, whereas 
the industrialists received more political support in the ISI period after 
1960. Even though the industrialists gained political support, the TOB, 
which had the right to allocated import licenses after 1960, was 
dominated by traders. The frustration of the industrialists within the 
TOB led to several open conflicts and divisions during the 1960s and 
1970s, and in 1969 a “rebellion” within the TOB, initially instigated by 
the Anatolian merchants and later joined by many industrialists, nearly 
split the organization in two  (Bianchi 1984, p. 255-7). 
From a Gramscian perspective, these struggles between the 
merchants’ and industrialists’ interests, and the more traditional and 
conservative TISK and the progressive TÜSIAD, are central, because 





they represent the dialectical struggle of the old and new forces 
inherent to the process of passive revolution. Or as Morton would 
have it “There is therefore a dialectic of revolution and restoration that 
becomes blocked in a situation of passive revolution as neither the old 
nor new class forces become hegemonic” (Morton 2011, p. 19). 
 
 
3.1 Schumpeterian democracy and unionism 
 
In the preceding section, we saw how the uneven and combined 
conditions in the domestic arena affected the bourgeoisie, while here 
we shall analyse how international conditions of U&CD affected 
labour unions and their tacit support for a specific form of democracy. 
The liberal democratic regime emerging in Turkey in the 1940s was 
embedded within an international cold war atmosphere. After WWII 
the US quickly realized the importance of Greece and Turkey, as a 
bulwark against the Soviet Union. The pressing situation in Greece, 
where a communist insurgency was taking place, made this realization 
all the more urgent (Kayaoğlu 2009, p. 325). Out of this moment the 
Truman Doctrine entered the stage. This was a foreign policy 
initiative, which established that it was the obligation of the “United 
States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation 
by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (Kayaoğlu 2009, p. 327). 
Turkey became the beneficiary of large amounts of aid and military 
funding, and the US administration praised the Turkish transition to 
democracy as a victory for the free world. While such praise was given, 
internally the US administration was more concerned for the stability 
of the regime and its position as a bulwark against communism 
(Kayaoğlu 2009, p. 327). Such a two-faced approach to democracy 
promotion has, according to Morton, been symptomatic for US 
foreign policy. This direction of policy is rooted in a Schumpeterian 
perception of a minimal standard of democracy, as an institutional 
design, which does not allow the rule of the people in the literal sense 
– this was perceived as leading to anarchy – but instead gives people a 
restricted choice between competing political elites (Morton 2011, pp. 
169-75). This is seen as the optimal way to allow for some sort of 





popular influence, while safeguarding the functionality of the system of 
governance. Such a definition of democracy is, from a Gramscian 
perspective, a bourgeois ideology, as it reproduces the separation 
between politics and economics inherent in capitalist relations of 
production. According to Morton, this “low intensity democracy” 
discourse has been an integral part of US foreign policy since 1945-
1955, and involves the promotion of moderate civil society 
organizations (Morton 2011, pp. 174-77). In the early days of the 
multiparty era, this took the form of the promotion of apolitical 
unionism in Turkey by the American labour union AFL (and as from 
1955 the AFL-CIO). The concentration of workers in apolitical labour 
unions and confederations was perceived as a necessity in order to 
stem the tide of socialist and communist sympathies and leading 
members of the AFL were thus instrumental in the creation of Türk-Iş 
(Mello 2007, p. 216). In the pursuit of such aims, Türk-Iş right from its 
founding received considerable amounts of foreign funding and 
organizational support from international organizations, such as the 
ILO, the ICFTU10 and the US. According to Theo Nichols, Nadir 
Sugur and Erol Demir, Türk-Iş received an amount of aid from the US 
– the Agency for International Development (AID) was especially 
generous – equivalent to its membership dues between 1960 and 1970 
(Bianchi 1984, p. 215; Jackson 1971, p. 74; Nichols, Sugur, and Demir 
2002, p. 25). In fact, it has been argued that Türk-Iş would not have 
been able to exist had it not been for the large amounts of foreign 
funding it received. The AFL-CIO was very active abroad since the 
very beginning of the Truman Doctrine and the Point Four Program, 
which was the technical assistance program for third world countries. 
In 1956, the AFL-CIO leader George Meany stated that “labor will 
support a program of substantial military and economic aid to other 
free nations to protect them from being forced to yield to commun-
ism” (Hagen and Ruttan 1987, p. 23). Such a policy was not a result of 
a US Government or CIA program, but was developed as a result of 
the reformist labour ideology of the founder of the AFL, Samuel 
Gompers. He was a fierce anti-communist union leader, the promoter 
of so-called “business unionism”, a form of labour unionism whose 
                                                            
10International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 





activities involve solely the improvement of workers’ rights within the 
existing framework of capitalism. Gompers unequivocally stated that 
“the AF of L stands squarely and unequivocally for the defense and 
maintenance of the existing order and for its development and 
improvement” (Scipes 2011, p. 7). Practically, business unionism has 
been characterized by an absence of any measure to educate its rank-
and-file members, an above-party political stand and a lack of internal 
democracy (Ibid., pp. 4-7). Within the Gramscian framework, then, this 
kind of unionism reproduces the separation of politics and economics 
inherent in liberal democracy and political science, and the promotion 
of such a labour-union ideology among the working classes in devel-
oping countries became an important part of US efforts to contain the 
development of communism among workers during the cold war 
(Mello 2007, p. 216).  
The AFL-CIO was, thus, intensely involved in the establishment 
and organization of the biggest Turkish labour confederation Türk-Iş 
and, as a consequence, Türk-Iş has always been the stronghold of 
apolitical, conservative, business unionism in Turkey. Practically, this 
has manifested itself in the acceptance of labour-saving technology and 
declining employment, a lack of union democracy, a strict hierarchy in 
which an élite within the working class has attained increased wages 
through uneven use of collective bargaining, and close collaboration 
with conservative governments (Bianchi 1984, pp. 234-37). This semi-
symbiotic relationship with the incumbent governments and the state 
bureaucracy is hinted at in its union regulations, which “include a 
commitment to ‘a high level of national democratic secular and social 
and state structure based on Ataturk’s principles and the Constitution’ 
(article 3, TÜRK-IŞ Regulations).” (Nichols, Sugur, and Demir 2002, 
p. 25). Furthermore, Türk-Iş has always made great efforts to distance 
itself from socialist ideology – up until the 1990s, for instance, it 
purposely did not use the word “working class”, employing the less 
ideologically charged word “workers´ movement” (Bacik and Dede 
2012, p. 802).  
With the change in political leadership and a complete overhaul of 
the legal framework of the state in the post-1960 coup era, which 
signified the further strengthening of the formal adequacy of the state 





through the above-mentioned reforms of strengthening plurality, the 
rule of law and labour rights, new labour confederations emerged. 
Thus, in the 1960s a new labour confederation called DISK – the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions – saw the light of day. 
The emergence of DISK, represented a reaction to the employer 
friendly and apolitical policies of Türk-Iş, and a turn towards socialist, 
political unionism.  
In the 1960s and 70s, DISK was the spearhead or peak-association 
for political unionism. It was founded in 1967 by four labour unions 
breaking away from Türk-Iş in defiance of the latter’s dependence on 
foreign aid and close corporatist relations with the governing parties 
(Dereli 1968, pp. 221-2). DISK became the flag bearer of political 
unionism and would signify a general politicization of Turkish union-
ism, even within Türk-Iş. It thus “openly advocated getting involved in 
political unionism for the purpose of promoting the revolutionary 
consciousness of workers and supporting the political party which 
would defend their interests” (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1992, p. 721). The 
tenets of DISK dictated that “There is need, therefore, to reshape the 
whole economy along socialistic lines and give an end to all forms of 
foreign and capitalistic exploitation.” (Dereli 1968, loc. cit.). As will 
become evident in the subsequent section, the ability of the CHP, 
under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, to promote moderates within 
DISK resulted in the support for the former by the latter in the 
elections of 1977. Despite its socialist credentials DISK was, with time, 
integrated into the orbit of nationalist Kemalist political relations, thus 
giving consent to the rule of dominant classes. 
As established in previous sections, the emergence of nationalism 
and anti-imperialism as common sense was continuously accepted by 
labour movements of the multiparty era, partly as a result of foreign 
intervention. It is thus argued by Cemil Boyraz that the Turkish 
workers and labour unions in the multiparty era focused on “rapid 
national economic development” and, in consequence,  
 
due to both peculiarist-essentialist-reductionist theoretical approaches and 
international inspirations from different struggles in the Third World and the 
Soviet policies […] the Turkish Left continued to prioritize the relation with 
nationalism over class politics. (Boyraz 2012, p. 112) 






Furthermore, the business-unionism of the largest labour confed-
eration, partially encouraged by the US, resulted in the reproduction of 
the division between the political and economic spheres inherent to 
the modern liberal and capitalist state. Remember that Gramsci noted 
that this separation was merely “methodological” (Gramsci 1971, 
p.160; Q13, §18, p. 1590, cit.) in the sense that an institutional sep-
aration is indeed taking place, but it does not represent the actual 
power structures on which the state rests – i.e. “This separation is both 
real and illusory” (Jessop, 2008, in Wetherly, Barrow, and Burnham 
2008, p. 146). Thus, the two above-mentioned factors contributed to 
the continued reproduction of this separation. According to Gramsci, 
exactly this separation blurs the class character of the state, and 
thereby, legitimizes the rule of the dominant groups by portraying 
certain ideological premises, as beneficial to the labour cause, while 
they in fact further the cause of the dominant groups. A stumped 




3.2 The new bourgeois parties 
 
With the emergence of representative democracy, and a growing 
civil society and private sector, the ideological basis of the dominant 
state classes changed to a more inclusive strategy of social control. The 
repressive policies of the single-party regime had alienated workers and 
the rural masses. In this sense, there are indications of a refinement of 
the ideology of the dominant classes taking place in the face of a crisis 
of legitimacy after the heavy-handed repression by the government 
during WWII (Balkan and Savran 2002, p. 34). Two developments will 
be emphasized here: the development of a more religious, anti-élitist 
discourse by the governing party, and legal concessions for the 
working classes, as well as political recognition of certain labour 
organizations.  
The subsequent sections will present a more specific Gramscian 
political analysis of the bourgeois parties and their attempts at estab-





lishing hegemonic alliances, and of the integration of labour unions in 
the period 1950-1980. The emergence of the DP in the 1940s and its 
political discourse and tactics of popular mobilization in the periphery 
of Turkey would become symptomatic for centre-right parties in the 
following decades; here especially we are thinking of the Justice Party 
(JP). There was a general tendency within these parties to perceive 
their popular mandates as an expression of the “national will”, thus 
attempting to universalize their policies and make them the simple 
execution of the nation at large. Such an approach was meant to 
legitimize the sometimes non-accommodating and coercive policies 
towards labour. Gramsci recognized this, when he noted: “the attempt 
is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the 
consent of the majority” (Gramsci 1971, p. 80, note 49; Q13, §37, p. 
1638). These populist tendencies in praxis resulted in the party élites to 
neglect the demands and aspirations of minority groups (Heper and 
Sayari 2002, pp. 78-80 and 99). One such minority group was the 
working class and the institutions claiming to represent them, such as 
Türk-Iş. The majoritarian democratic tendencies coupled with the fer-
vent anti-communist political lines of these parties prevented them 
from ideological integrating the working class. Unlike the experience in 
Mexico, where Morton describes the legalization of the Communist 
Party and the subsequent merger with other parties, meaning that “the 
PCM [Partido Comunista Mexicano] […] effectively dissolved itself 
while attempting to electorally compete” (Morton 2011, p. 121), the 
Turkish left and workers’ movements mostly stayed on the fringes of 
parliamentary politics11. At best, the right wing bourgeois parties’ 
alliances with labour movements were based on piecemeal legal con-
cessions. As will be evident, this was the strategy of both the DP and JP. 
The leaders of the DP understood where the CHP had failed during 
single-party rule in the preceding decades and took full advantage of it. 
This entailed portraying themselves as the party of the periphery, of 
Turkish folklore, of the religious and of the private entrepreneurs 
                                                            
11 The relative electoral success of the Turkish Labour Party (TIP – Türkiye İşçi Partisi) and its 
entrance into parliament in 1965 is naturally not neglected or forgotten, but it is simply considered 
to be outside the scope of the article. However, as described by Erkan Doğan, the internal conflicts 
of the party led it to dissolve only four years after it entered parliament (Doğan 2010, pp. 324-5). 





(Heper 1976, p. 495), which was in stark contrast to the elitist and 
metropolitan character of the CHP. They referred to the repressive 
policies during WWII with slogans such as “Artik Yeter” (“really 
enough!”) (Leder 1979, p. 85), and openly opposed the militant sec-
ularism of the CHP (Eligür 2010, p. 52). The latter gained them the 
support from the Islamic brotherhoods, who helped mobilize signif-
icant numbers of voters for a successive line of center-right parties 
beginning with the DP (Eligür 2010, p. 52). Thus, the ascendency of 
the DP witnessed a restructuring of society, both economically, and 
rhetorically, as producers outside the immediate realm of the state 
(understood in the non-integral sense) slowly gained ascendency. 
Even though the DP was critical of the élitist, urban and secular 
character of the Kemalist bureaucracy, it and its successor parties 
stayed within the confines of Kemalist ideology. The founders of the 
party were themselves former CHP members and officials in the bur-
eaucracy – some even ministers in the governments of the single-party 
era (Ahmad 2003, p. 153). The DP could thus not be perceived as an 
alternative to Kemalism, but rather as a re-interpretation, or refine-
ment, if you will, of the Kemalist ideology of the dominant groups. 
With the implementation of the first free elections in 1950, the DP 
won the elections by a wide margin – 54 percent of the popular vote 
(Szyliowicz 1966, p. 276). Based on the policies described above, the 
DP government managed to create a broad alliance of diverse social 
classes, consisting of the landed élite, the peasants, much of the 
working class, and the private sector industrial and commercial bour-
geoisie, who had grown weary of bureaucratic constraints and domin-
ation of the economy (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1992, p. 713; Jacoby 2004, p. 
104; Mello 2007, pp. 214-5). Consent for DP rule was given by the 
working classes in exchange for the promise of the granting of the 
right to strike. However, by 1952, it became clear that such concess-
ions would not be granted. The government was true to its national 
developmentalist discourse, where economic development of the 
nation was the primary concern, and anything that would impede the 
accumulation of capital was out of the question (Mello 2007, p. 215). 
Instead of the right to strike, the DP government was able to entertain 
a strenuous alliance with the working class, now represented by Türk-





Iş, by incorporating the leadership and offering other piecemeal legal 
concessions, such as paid weekends, annual leave, minimum wage, and 
labour tribunals with a worker serving as judge (Mello 2007, pp. 216-7).  
This relationship between labour and the DP government was sus-
tained for as long as the economy was kept afloat. With the advent of 
declining agricultural exports in 1954, the hegemonic alliances estab-
lished in the elections of 1950 and 1954 began to show serious cracks. 
As the industrial bourgeoisie grew stronger and more independent, it 
began to articulate demands, irreconcilable with the patronage-driven 
and agriculturally-oriented economic policies of the DP lawmakers 
(Öncü 2003, pp. 317-8). Furthermore, the distribution of scarce 
foreign exchange, through the control of import licenses, along non-
market lines, according to arbitrary criteria, such as political patronage, 
was creating bottle-necks for the industrial bourgeoisie, to their great 
frustration (Keyder 1987, pp. 145 and 171). In true populist style, the 
DP government refused to cut spending despite a mounting trade 
deficit, and increased money printing, with inflation as the immediate 
result (ibid., p. 133). This led to increasing dissatisfaction with the 
government within urban salaried segments, as price levels were rising 
at a fast pace. Furthermore, the hollowing out of the economic bene-
fits of the bureaucracy under DP rule made them highly unpopular 
amongst this group (Szyliowicz 1966, p. 278).  
The new government’s lack of ability to cope with criticism in the 
face of adversity would become its demise. As criticism was mounting 
from several areas of Turkish society, which had formerly rallied 
behind the government, it began responding with increasingly heavy-
handed approaches. Civil liberties, such as press freedom, fair and free 
elections, freedom of speech, and the right to assembly were curbed in 
order to silence the opposition (Ahmad 1977, p. 53; Szyliowicz 1966, 
p. 278). The labour movement soon felt this tightening of political 
power when, in the aftermath of the Istanbul riots, the government 
seized the opportunity which martial law presented to close down 
unwanted labour unions that were considered a threat (Bianchi 1984, 
p. 216). The reaction of the government to criticism from its elect-
orate, is an example of the dominant group that starts to dominate 
instead of leading. Gramsci noted how “the supremacy of a social 





group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” [dominio] and as 
“intellectual and moral leadership”” (Gramsci 1971, p. 57; Q19, §24, p. 
2010). A crisis becomes a crisis of hegemony, when domination comes 
to the forefront and reveals the self-preserving character of the domin-
ant group. In the years that followed political instability grew and anti-
government demonstrations appeared with a steady frequency 
throughout the country, until the army decided to intervene in 1960 
(Ahmad 1977, pp. 57-58). A hegemonic crisis had emerged, severing 
the ties established between societal groups. The persistent support for 
the “old” agricultural class, together with economic crisis, had jeopard-
ized one of the central alliances of the integral state system. The milit-
ary and bureaucracy who perceived themselves as the guardians of the 
Kemalist “mission” to modernize society had sided with the indust-
rialists (Öncü 2003, pp. 317-18).  
The 1960s and 70s witnessed a situation where the growth of the 
working classes and urban migration changed the demographic 
landscape of Turkey to a degree hitherto unknown. As many as 
650,000 rural migrants settled in the larger urban areas in the mid-
1970s (Özbudun and Ulusan 1980, pp. 271-2). This posed a challenge 
for the bourgeois political parties, who were forced to accommodate 
the demands of such groups. The establishment of the social state 
after 1960 encouraged a development within the intellectual political 
cadres of the bourgeoisie to direct focus to issues of redistribution. On 
the national scale, the State Planning Organization implemented 
policies aimed at directing economic activity towards the less dev-
eloped eastern regions (Özbudun and Ulusan 1980, pp. 73-4). The new 
parliamentary system, with low electoral thresholds and liberal asso-
ciational legislation led to a proliferation of different political parties, 
all emphasizing redistribution policies in different shapes. The 
conservative center-right bourgeois party, the JP, aligned with the 
approach of the conservative and militant industrialists within TOB 
and TISK, employed a discourse of rapid growth now and redist-
ribution later (Özbudun and Ulusan 1980, p. 75). This was reflected in 
the way that the party attempted to persuade labour leaders to give 
concessions in the form of reduction of demands for redistribution in 
return for representational monopolization. This policy was an attempt 





by militant industrialists to minimize the rising labour costs, which 
were a direct effect of the rights enshrined in the constitution, and to 
isolate the emergence of the more militant unions in DISK. The 
representation by JP intellectuals of the larger industrialists resulted in 
a situation, where the demands of smaller businessmen, who were 
exploited by bigger industrialists, were neglected. The short-sighted-
ness of industrialists represented through the policies of their major 
representative, the JP, and the inability of JP to solve the conflict 
within TOB between industrialists and merchants led to consecutive 
breakdowns in the consent of JP patronage networks within two 
integral state institutions.  
The first occurred in 1969, when Necmettin Erbakan led a coup 
within TOB with the backing of larger industrialists and smaller 
Anatolian businessmen. The JP managed to avert the crisis in the end, 
as allied employers were able to nullify Erbakan’s election to the 
presidency of TOB (Bianchi 1984, p. 256). The second and more 
profound crisis of legitimacy occurred when labour riots broke out in 
1970 as a response by workers from the Istanbul-Izmit area within 
Türk-Iş to perceived injustice at the hands of a conservative leadership 
and its close ties to the JP government out of touch with the demands 
of their members. It was the most violent display of workers’ dismay 
in Turkish history, and the army had to be deployed to quell the 
uprising (Bianchi 1984, p. 202). Not long after, the JP government was 
given an ultimatum to step down, and thus the second coup of the 
multiparty era was a reality. When parliamentary governance was 
resumed in 1973, reforms had been implemented to curtail the range 
of agency of institutions, notably an amendment restricting associa-
tional activity by the technocratic government (ibid., 205).  
The elections in 1973 were won by a revamped CHP. The former 
corporatist state-party had undergone significant changes since 1965. 
Spurred on by the loss of intellectual voters to the Turkish Worker´s 
Party, the CHP announced its new status as a centre-left (or social 
democratic) party. Reformist groups, such a social democrats, were, 
according to Gramsci, from the point of view of the dominant class a 
form of passive revolution (Showstack Sassoon 1980, p. 213). Thus, 
the emergence of Bülent Ecevit as the leader of the CHP in the 1970s 





and the CHP’s attempts to cultivate social democratic leadership in 
both Türk-Iş and DISK constituted a refinement in the passive rev-
olution of the working class. Until this point, the dominant bourgeois 
parties had applied a strategy that entailed a non-ideological integration 
of workers through piecemeal concessions; however, with the emer-
gence of social democratic ideology in Turkish politics, an attempt at 
integration of workers was made both at the immediate economic and 
ideological level. The CHP´s party programme of 1976 entailed a focus 
on growth and redistribution, emphasizing that both were possible at 
the same time, and indeed declaring that responsible development 
could not occur without the latter. In this way, the CHP attempted to 
reframe the concept of economic growth, distinguishing between 
“growth” and “development”, claiming that the former entails a 
myopic focus on economic factors, while the latter is a holistic 
approach concerned with a whole range of humanistic factors beside 
the economic (Özbudun and Ulusan 1980, p. 69). Additionally, the 
CHP had abandoned its adherence to strict étatism, as the party 
programme stipulated the support for private sector development 
(Özbudun and Ulusan 1980, p. 68). The CHP’s platform of develop-
ment and social justice were, moreover, garnering a lot of votes from 
the large urban centres, and the party pushed for policies enhancing 
local municipal autonomy and increasing allocation of resources for 
urban squatter settlements (Özbudun and Ulusan 1980, p. 332).  
On such a platform, which had been developed in the early 1970s, 
but not formalized before 1976, the CHP entered governments in 
1973 and 1976. The 1970s provided the CHP with a difficult and 
tumultuous environment for the realization of their hegemonic quest. 
The effects of the international oil crisis were being felt as remittances 
decreased, unemployment increased and foreign exchange reserves 
were hollowed out (Keyder 1987, pp. 185, 188 and 195). This encour-
aged further activism on the part of TISK, which had been embarking 
on consecutive and protracted industry-wide lockouts since the early 
1970s. Thus, in 1976 “employers in the metal goods industry united 
[…]to launch a larger and more successful national lockout that 
dragged on for nearly two years” (Bianchi 1984, p. 267). On the other 
hand, the CHP had slightly more success in integrating labour unions 





into its political orbit. The continued efforts by the CHP to moderate 
DISK by promoting social democratic unionists within the confed-
eration, bore fruit when the party gained the support of DISK in the 
1973 and 1977 elections (Blind 2008, p. 47).  
The rise of social democratic ideology within the CHP encouraged 
the development of several right wing coalition governments in the 
1970s – the so called Nationalist Front governments (Ahmad 1977, pp. 
327-54). The fervent anti-communism and anti-socialism of the two 
major parties in this coalition, the JP and the ultranationalist National-
ist Movement Party (MHP), added to the centrifugal tendencies of the 
period. The rise of the MHP epitomizes the predomination of coer-
cion attributed to the process of passive revolution. First of all, the 
party functioned as an institution integrating the petty-bourgeois 
producer class left behind by the rapid large-scale industrial growth 
implemented by the JP. In this sense, the MHP functioned as an 
appendage to the JP which secured the continued support of the 
groups which had been neglected by the policies of the JP itself. 
Secondly, the coercive aspect lay in its unofficial affiliation with 
paramilitary ultra-nationalist groups, which were used to suppress 
increasing left-wing activism. The JP tacitly allowed and even encour-
aged such activity (Balkan and Savran 2002, p. 153; Jacoby 2004, pp. 
139-40). This development is emblematic of the kind of development 
described by Gramsci: “A weakened state organization is like an 
enfeebled army; the arditi, that is the private armed organizations, enter 
the field with a double task: to use illegality, while the state appears to 
remain within legality, and as a means to reorganize the state itself." 
(Gramsci 1992, p. 217; alternative translation in Gramsci 1971, p. 232; 
Q1, §133, p. 121). 
The militancy of left wing groups, who were engaged in a war of 
movement, in the hope of toppling the bourgeois state through armed 
intervention, preferably with the help of progressive army officers, 
coupled with the violent opposition of right wing para-military groups, 
led to street violence to such a degree that the armed forces chose to 
carry out its third Caesarist coup in 30 years. This portended the end 
of the road for the ISI accumulation regime and its attendant political 
structure, i.e. the social state.  








It is the contention of this article that Gramscian theory provides us 
with illuminating insights into the undercurrents of the deeper power 
structures of the modern Turkish state. We have attempted to clarify 
the capitalist origins and nature of the modern Turkish state, emerging 
as a product of the accumulative relations of capitalist production 
within a U&CD, which shaped the social, ideological and material 
relations of Turkish society. Gramscian concepts provides us with 
insightful knowledge regarding the contradictory labour policies of the 
period in question, because his approach highlights the highly complex 
and inherently contradictory nature of the modern Turkish (integral) 
state. In this sense, one cannot in fact talk of state policies towards 
labour, as if the state was a singular coherent body, as this implies that 
the state is something extraneous to civil society. The integral state is 
an amalgam of forces and social groups ripe with contradictions and 
demands. Furthermore, the integral state, contrary to the Weberian 
state tradition, is defined as both coercion and consent. This entails 
that Turkish institutions, such as labour unions, which seemed to be 
protecting the rights of the working class, in Gramscian theory in fact 
form part of the integral state, integrating workers through the estab-
lishment of consent for rule.  
Generally the developments of labour politics of the 1950s, 60s and 
70s can be said, from a Gramscian perspective, to be indicative of the 
inability of the dominant classes to absorb and accommodate demands 
formulated from below by a rising new working class, and therefore 
the inability of the dominant classes to serve as a coherent force by 
forging lasting alliances with subordinate classes, as they attempt to 
consolidate the rule of the modern capitalist state. The urban / rural 
division is clearly visible in the support base of the bourgeois parties – 
with the conservative centre-right parties catering mostly to the peas-
ants and the generally smaller conservative employers of TISK, and 
the social democratic CHP, catering to the urban working classes and 
the bigger progressive employers of TÜSIAD. None of the leading 
parties were able to gain the support from both groups up until 1980. 





Furthermore, most of the demands formulated by the working classes 
were of a nature functioning within the common sense framework of 
the integral state, as a consequence of the conservative or reformist 
character of labour unions. Why was this so? Why were the dominant 
classes unable to absorb demands, and why were the demands of the 
majority of the working class framed within common sense? As 
described above, the answer to these questions may be found in the 
U&CD of capitalism, which fostered the development of a strong 
bureaucratic class and a weak bourgeoisie. This stunted bourgeois 
development resulted in a weak bourgeoisie, wracked with internal 
divisions along temporal / spatial lines. Concomitantly, the early 
working classes gave consent to nationalist ideology, as they were 
confronted with the War of Independence. The Soviet support of the 
Kemalist élite likewise encouraged workers to support the Kemalists. 
Later on as primitive accumulation took hold in the East, the urban 
migrants, who were coming to the cities to find work in industry, 
arrived with a rural mentality, which split workers into groups along 
regional lines, preventing the emergence of a collective consciousness. 
This latter factor points to the fact that the relations of production 
undergirding the Turkish integral state of the period in question, 
namely the combined character of development, with feudal and 
primitive accumulation in the eastern regions and capitalist accumul-
ation mainly in the West, led to a large part of the relations of the 
integral state being based on coercion rather than consent. The above 
factors led to a blocked dialectic of the old classes (trading bourgeoisie, 
landowners, and petty producers) and the new classes (the industrial 
bourgeoisie and workers). These factors were, within the Gramscian 
theoretical framework, a passive revolution of capital taking place 
within the U&CD of capitalism. In other words, the bureaucracy im-
ported international modes of production in the face of an absence of 
bourgeois hegemony. The U&CD of the Turkish integral state was 
expressed in the rural and authoritarian mentality of the bulk of Turk-
ish industrialists, which made them unable and unwilling to overcome 
the obstacle to the functional adequacy of the capitalist state posed by 
the formal adequacy of the new social state. This resulted in a serious 
crisis of legitimacy of the bourgeoisie in the 1970s. 





The above-mentioned developments were part of the development 
of the capitalist type of state, where civil society and the economy be-
come institutionally separated from the state apparatus. Such an instit-
utionalization took place as laws were implemented that would encour-
age the emergence of a plethora of institutions, i.e. what is traditionally 
termed civil society. In itself such a decentralization of society can be 
perceived as an act of integration by the dominant classes in the sense 
that it is an accommodation of demands for greater political rights 
uttered by the subordinate classes, at the same time as continuing the 
exploitative accumulation of capitalism (Balkan and Savran 2002, p. 34). 
This institutional separation created barriers for the extraction of sur-
plus of the industrialists, as a range of demands from below now had 
to be taken into consideration. The increasingly militant working clas-
ses, exercising their rights to bargain and strike, were met by similarly 
militancy from many employers, not inclined to negotiate. The meth-
ods employed by the industrialists, in order to overcome obstacles to 
short-term surplus extraction created by the formal adequacy of the 
state, were of a coercive character, as they attempted to force labour 
unions into submission through protracted lock-outs. The bourgeois 
party, the JP, followed suit, as it criticized newly gained rights. In this 
sense, it is a case in which form problematizes content, as the system 
set in place to facilitate non-political surplus extraction and non-coer-
cive capital accumulation resulted in protracted conflict within the in-
tegral state, i.e. a situation where the élite groups are dominant instead 
of leading (Gramsci 1992, p. 136, Q1, §44, p. 41; second draft in Gram-
sci 1971, p. 57 and note 5, Q19, §24, p. 2010). Furthermore, in this blur-
ring of the capitalist nature of the state “the shortcoming is that state 
(politics) and market (economics) are taken as ahistoric starting points of 
analysis” (Morton 2011, p. 170). This ahistoricity ignores the contingent 
relationship between the modern state and capitalist market forces. In  
the Gramscian perspective, then, the modern Turkish state is a product 
of the U&CD of capitalism that propels domestic élites to embark on 
a mimetic exercise, as they transform the state through the importation 
of capitalist relations of production, while the combined aspect of 
development results in a mix of consent and coercion, with emphasis 
on the latter, emblematic of the process of passive revolution.  
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